THE UNITED STATES, SUDAN AND COUNTERTERRORISM:
A CASE STUDY
“[T]he strike in regards to the Khartoum chemical plant cannot be justified…These are pretty harsh words. I know one
thing for sure. The intelligence agencies of other countries look at that and they think, ‘Wait a minute, if you hit the
wrong target or if in fact the justification was not accurate, it is either ineptitude or, to get back to the wag-the-dog
theory, something else is going on. That gets to our credibility. And that is why both the administration and the
Congress must insist on a foreign policy where if you draw a line in the sand, if you make a statement, your credibility
is tremendously important.”
U.S. Senator Pat Roberts [1]
“You cannot have people saying ‘We have proof of certain things’ against a whole country but nobody knows what
that proof is. There is a difference between whether something is proved sufficiently to bring a man before a
court…and whether it is sufficient to prove to adopt one’s political line.”
Raymond Kendall, International Secretary-General of Interpol [2]
“A politicized [terrorism] list makes people doubt your objectivity”.
Ambassador Robert Oakley, former State Department counterterrorist coordinator [3]
In his address to the joint session of Congress and the American people in the week following the
murderous terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, President George Bush declared that the war on
terrorism would be the single most important struggle facing the United States and its allies: “We
will direct every resource at our command – every means of diplomacy, every tool of intelligence,
every instrument of law enforcement, every financial influence, and every necessary weapon of
war – to the disruption and to the defeat of the global terror network.” [4] Even before the horrific
events of 9/11, the previous Clinton Administration also repeatedly stated that counter-terrorism
lay at the heart of its foreign policy. President Clinton devoted a number of key-note speeches to
the subject, including a 1995 address marking United Nations’ 50th anniversary, when he spoke of
the terrorists who had “plotted to destroy the very hall we gather in today.” [5] His administration
was said to have doubled counter-terrorist spending across 40 departments and agencies. [6] This was
said to have marked the Clinton Administration as “the first to undertake a systematic anti-terrorist
effort, in terms of resources and anti-terrorist activity.” [7]
For the global war on terrorism to succeed those at the heart of this struggle must learn from
mistakes that have been made in counter-terrorism and with regard to the function and nature of
the intelligence which plays such a central role in this war. Sudan provides many lessons in this
respect. In any examination of the war on terrorism, and particularly the role of the United States
in the war on terrorism – both before and after the 11 September 2001 attacks – Sudan provides a
compelling case study in systemic American policy and intelligence failure, from which much can
be learned. It was a failure which also extended to false claims of Sudanese involvement with
weapons of mass destruction. If the international community is to succeed in the war on terror and
the eradication of weapons of mass destruction these are mistakes which must not be repeated. As
Senator Roberts pointed out in the comments cited above, American intelligence and policy
failures with regard to Sudan has undermined the credibility of the United States and its assertions,
even amongst key NATO allies.
The Importance of Sudan
Sudan is uniquely placed with regard to counter-terrorism for at least two simple reasons. As a
country with neighbours including Egypt, Libya, Chad, Uganda and – across the Red Sea – Saudi
Arabia, it is strategically placed, bridging the Middle East, Horn of Africa and the Sahel. The
importance of the Sudanese government in supporting the war on terrorism within this political
environment is self-evident. The second reason is perhaps even more important. Milton Viorst,
author of Sandcastles: The Arabs in Search of the Modern World, has noted that “Sudan is the
only state in our age that has formally opted for Islam as its system of government”. As such
Sudan attracted numerous Islamist visitors from a wide variety of Islamic schools of thought, both
political and religious. Islamist models of government were also intensely debated at regular
conferences held in Sudan in the early 1990s under the auspices of Islamist ideologue, Dr Hasan
al-Turabi. [8] A number of individuals and political organisations that would subsequently cross the
line and become identified with acts of terrorism visited Sudan in those years. Osama bin-Laden
himself lived in Sudan from 1991 until 1996, until asked to leave Sudan by the Khartoum
authorities. He subsequently went on to launch his terrorist campaign from Afghanistan.
It is also the case that the United States and others in the international community committed to the
war on terrorism need to engage positively within the Islamic world. There is a search for Islamic
models of government which are receptive to Western values. Sudan is precisely such a country.
Professor Tim Niblock, one of the foremost British experts on Islam and Sudan, has pointed out
two areas in which Sudan’s model differs from mainstream Islamist thought. One is the Sudanese
Islamists’ “explicit acceptance of liberal democracy as the appropriate form of political
organisation for Sudan. The advocacy of liberal democracy…went well beyond the stress which
Islamist movements customarily place on the need for shura (consultation).” Secondly, the
Sudanese model with regard to women is “qualitatively different from that proposed in most
Islamist programmes. The emphasis is on women ‘escaping from social oppression’ and ‘playing a
full part in building the new society’, rather than on their primary duty lying within the family”. [9]
That Sudan is in a new phase of its history is clear. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement, signed
in early 2005, ended decades of north-south civil war in Sudan. The agreement also makes
provision for democratic elections throughout Sudan – another key component in Western
engagement within the Islamic world.
That Sudan has played and continues to play a pivotal role in the war on terrorism is largely
unrecognised and unreported. Glimpses of Sudan’s importance to the war on terrorism, and its
repeated attempts to assist, have emerged from time-to-time. [10] In April 2005, The Los Angeles
Times reported that the Bush Administration has “forged a close intelligence partnership” with
Sudan, assistance which included sharing intelligence and providing access to terrorism suspects.
The Administration noted that Sudan’s assistance is “important, functional and current” and that
the Sudanese intelligence service could become a “top tier” partner of the CIA. The head of the
Sudanese intelligence service was quoted as saying that: “We have a strong partnership with the
CIA”. [11]
Despite this recognition of the importance of Sudan in the war on terrorism, even current
American policy towards Khartoum continues to reflect the flawed approach that has characterised
Washington’s position regarding Sudan. At the heart of this systemic failure has been a tendency
to play politics with regard to claims of terrorism, systemic intelligence failure including both poor
and politicised intelligence, together with false claims of involvement with weapons of mass
destruction, and errors in judgement on the part of the Clinton Administration – failures which have also continued to a lesser degree under the Bush Administration. These flaws led to the
mishandling of potentially pivotal counter-terrorism opportunities. [12]
Crying Wolf: Playing Politics with Terrorism:
For what were at best questionable motives, the Clinton Administration chose to destabilise Sudan
economically, militarily and diplomatically. As part of this policy Washington sought to isolate the
Khartoum government. To this end, in August 1993, the Clinton Administration placed Sudan on
its official list of state sponsors of international terrorism. Administration officials lost no
opportunity of repeating claims that Sudan was a sponsor of international terrorism. [13] Virtually
every press item on Sudan mentions, at least in passing, that Sudan is on this list or has otherwise
been accused of involvement in terrorism. Whatever other states on the list may or may not have
done, Sudan was listed despite the fact that there was not a single example of Sudanese
involvement in any act of international terrorism. That Sudan was listed without any evidence of
its alleged support for terrorism – as much was confirmed before and after the listing is a matter of
record. [14] Objective American observers of events at the time have said that they did not believe
Sudan warranted such a listing. Former United States President Jimmy Carter, long interested in
Sudanese affairs, went out of his way to see what evidence there was for Sudan’s listing. Carter
was told there was no evidence:
“In fact, when I later asked an assistant secretary of state he said they did not have
any proof, but there were strong allegations.” [15]
It would appear that Don Petterson, the American ambassador to Sudan at the time, was not even
briefed prior to the decision to list Sudan being taken. When he queried the decision, he was told
by an assistant secretary of state that the “new evidence was conclusive”. [16] The assistant secretary
of state briefing Ambassador Petterson would have been the same assistant secretary of state who
told former President Carter a few days later that the Clinton Administration did not have any
evidence, but that there were “strong allegations”. [17] In any event, Petterson stated that he was
“surprised” that Sudan was put on the terrorism list. Petterson also confirmed that there was no
conclusive evidence to warrant the listing. [18]
Patterns of Global Terrorism is the mandatory annual US government report on terrorism. In
1992, the year before Sudan’s listing, the report stated that: “There is no evidence that the
Government of Sudan conducted or sponsored a specific terrorist attack in the past year, and the
government denies supporting any form of terrorism activity” [19] The 1993 Patterns of Global
Terrorism, the first report which included Sudan on this list, clearly stated that “there is no
conclusive evidence linking the Government of Sudan to any specific terrorist incident during the year”. [20] The 1994 Patterns of Global Terrorism once again noted that: “There is no evidence that
Sudan, which is dominated by the National Islamic Front (NIF), conducted or sponsored a specific
act of terrorism in 1994”. [21]
There can be no doubt that Sudan’s 1993 listing as a state sponsor of terrorism by the United
States fundamentally undermined Washington’s credibility with regard to terrorism. American
anti-terrorism legislation should provide an unassailable, black and white legal framework within
which to combat terrorism – all the more so given the Bush Administration’s declaration that the
war on terrorism is a moral crusade. The simple fact is that the Clinton Administration’s listing of
Sudan as a state sponsor of terrorism, in the clear absence of any proof or evidence of such
activity, was an abuse of United States anti-terrorism legislation for what were in any instance
questionable policy reasons. The comments of Raymond Kendall, International Secretary-General
of Interpol, on claims in these circumstances, are telling: “You cannot have people saying ‘We
have proof of certain things’ against a whole country but nobody knows what that proof is. There
is a difference between whether something is proved sufficiently to bring a man before a
court…and whether it is sufficient to prove to adopt one’s political line.” [22]
It is also worth noting the extent to which inclusion on the list is dependent on political
considerations (as opposed to actual involvement in terrorism) at any one moment in time. Iraq,
for example, was first listed in 1979, was de-listed in 1982 when it went to war against Iran,
something seen as being in the American interest, and was put back on after the Gulf war. Nothing
had changed in the meantime – Saddam Hussein’s government was in power throughout.
Expediency had dictated Iraq’s removal and then relisting. [23] In other words, putting politics before
reality.
Any detailed examination of the Clinton Administration’s claims of Sudan’s alleged involvement
in sponsoring international terrorism exposes the almost unbelievable shallowness of such
allegations. [24] The continuing absence of any intelligence to support the Clinton Administration’s
allegations of Sudanese involvement in terrorism was obvious. In a 26 December 1996
International Herald Tribune article by veteran American investigative reporter Tim Weiner, for
example, it was clear that no evidence or proof had emerged: “U.S. officials have no hard proof
that Sudan still provides training centers for terrorists”. Mr Weiner also interviewed key American
officials “responsible for analyzing the Sudan”. The answer to whether or not Sudan was involved
in supporting terrorism, was “we just don’t know”. Sudan, nevertheless, continued to be listed as a
state sponsor of terrorism.
Perversely, despite the continuing absence of any evidence of Sudanese involvement in
international terrorism, the Clinton Administration escalated its “terrorism” claims. On 3
November 1997, citing claims of Sudanese “involvement” in terrorism, President Clinton signed
executive order 13067, under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1703
et seq) and the National Emergencies Act (50 USC 1641 c), which imposed comprehensive trade
and economic sanctions against Sudan, declaring “that the policies of Sudan constitute an
extraordinary and unusual threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States”. [25]
The Administration claimed that these sanctions were introduced as “direct consequence of the
Sudanese regime’s sponsorship of international terrorism”. [26]
The terrorism list has itself come under criticism from within the United States from academia,
media and former counter-terrorism experts. The US News & World Report has stated that “four
former State Department counterterrorism coordinators have stated that the terrorism list “is too
blunt, too rigid, and too often corrupted by political considerations”. [27] The Los Angeles Times
has quoted a senior US government official familiar with terrorist threats in the region as stating
that Sudan was not at present a state sponsor of terrorism: “they have gone a long way past a
passing grade on counter-terrorism cooperation and they don’t technically belong on the list.” [28]
Professor Marina Ottaway, an international affairs specialist at the Washington-based Carnegie
Endowment for Peace, has noted that politics outweighed good judgement as far as the terrorism
list was concerned. [29]
That the Bush Administration chose to continue both with Sudan’s listing as a “state sponsor” of
terrorism and comprehensive sanctions – particularly in the face of clear and ongoing Sudanese
cooperation in counter-terrorism – clearly demonstrates poor judgement, is disappointing and once
again only serves to undermines American credibility regarding the war on terrorism. That
Washington has continued to play politics with terrorism is clear, with Bush Administration
officials stating that Sudan would come off the “terrorism list” if they signed a peace agreement
ending the war in southern Sudan. [30] American credibility continues to be brought into question in
as much as the peace agreement has signed and Sudan still remains on the list.
Intelligence Failure
Intelligence is at the heart of any counter-terrorism policy. The extent of the Clinton
Administration’s intelligence failure regarding Sudan was breathtaking, from which there are clear
lessons to be learnt. American intelligence failure with regard to Sudan was in at least two areas.
One was simple intelligence failure – an inability to correctly assess or analyse events in Sudan,
either politically or with regard to Sudan’s value in analysing or countering terrorism. The second
area of failure was the use of politicised intelligence – the use of selective intelligence reports
(themselves subsequently revealed to have been inaccurate) in justifying and pursuing a policy of
isolating and destabilising Sudan.
The degree of American intelligence failure regarding Sudan was revealed in part when, in 1998, it
was admitted that at least one hundred CIA reports on Sudan and terrorism were scrapped as
unreliable or having been fabricated. [31] The number of reports discounted may in reality have run
into the hundreds. The CIA had realised that the reports in question had been fabricated, probably
by political opponents of the government or other anti-Sudanese forces or simply for financial
gain. It is clear that the American intelligence agencies were either unable or disinclined to check
the accuracy of their sources, and were all too eager to rely on information of dubious quality
because it supported the Clinton Administration’s preconceived ideas with regard to Sudan.
Presumably, these reports, exploited for political reasons, had been at the heart of Sudan’s listing
as a state sponsor of terrorism.
The politicisation of intelligence with regard to Sudan was clear to see in the wake of the February
1993 attack on the World Trade Center. In a remarkably clumsy way, the Clinton Administration
has sought from time to time to insinuate that Sudan was somehow involved in the bombing.
Given the Clinton Administration’s obvious eagerness to attribute any act of terrorism to Sudan, it
is clear that had there been the slightest evidence of the Sudanese government’s involvement in such a direct attack on the United States, it would not only have immediately trumpeted it around
the world, but savage retaliation would have followed. In its attempts to implicate Sudan in the
1993 World Trade Center bombing, the Clinton Administration contradicted itself on several
occasions. In March 1993, for example, the United States government stated that the World Trade
Center bombing was carried out by a poorly trained local group of individuals who were not under
the auspices of a foreign government or international network. [32] In June 1993, the American
authorities again stated there was no evidence of foreign involvement in the New York bombing or
conspiracies. [33] As a means of justifying its listing of Sudan as a state sponsor of terrorism, the
American government then reversed its position in August 1993 alleging Sudanese involvement in
the New York bomb plots. [34] This finding was then comprehensively contradicted in 1996 by
Ambassador Philip C. Wilcox Jr., the Department of State’s Coordinator for Counterterrorism. On
the occasion of the release of the 1995 Patterns of Global Terrorism, on 30 April 1996,
Ambassador Wilcox made it very clear that there was no Sudanese involvement whatsoever in the
World Trade Center bombings:
“We have looked very, very carefully and pursued all possible clues that there might
be some state sponsorship behind the World Trade Center bombing. We have found
no such evidence, in spite of an exhaustive search, that any state was responsible for
that crime. Our information indicates that Ramzi Ahmed Yousef and his gang were a
group of freelance terrorists, many of whom were trained in Afghanistan, who came
from various nations but who did not rely on support from any state.” [35]
Yet, earlier that month, on 3 April 1996, the then American ambassador to the U.N., Madeleine
Albright, in meetings at the United Nations, claimed that two Sudanese diplomats had been
involved in the World Trade Center bombing, and other “plots”. [36] This presents an interesting
situation. Mrs Albright’s political line contradicted by the professional anti-terrorism expert,
Ambassador Wilcox. On something as serious as allegations of terrorism, allegations involving the
murderous bombing of the World Trade Center and a conspiracy to bomb other targets in New
York, such a divergence is extraordinary and yet again only but undermines the credibility of
American claims with regard to Sudanese “involvement” in terrorism.
A striking example of ongoing American intelligence failure on Sudan was the closure by the
Clinton Administration of the American embassy in Khartoum in 1996. This decision was
presented as yet one more example of concern over Sudan’s alleged support for international
terrorism. CIA reports were said to have stated that American embassy staff and their families
were in danger. [37] The Clinton Administration’s spokesman, Nicholas Burns, stated at the time that:
“We have been concerned for a long period of time about the activities and
movements of specific terrorist organizations who are resident in Sudan. Over the
course of many, many conversations with the Sudanese Government, we simply could
not be assured that the Sudanese Government was capable of protecting our
Americans against the specific threats that concerned us…The specific nature of
these threats, the persistence of these threats, and our root belief at the end of all these
conversations that this particular government could not protect them led us to take
this extraordinary measure of withdrawing all of our diplomats.” [38]
It is now admitted the reports cited in justifying this decision were subsequently withdrawn as
having been fabricated. As the New York Times investigation documented:
“In late 1995 the CIA realized that a foreign agent who had warned repeatedly of
startling terrorist threats to U.S. diplomats, spies and their children in Khartoum was
fabricating information. They withdrew his reports, but the climate of fear and
mistrust created by the reports bolstered the case for withdrawing personnel from the
U.S. Embassy in Khartoum, officials said…The embassy remained closed, even
though, as a senior intelligence official put it, ‘the threat wasn’t there’ as of 1996.” [39]
The New York Times also reported that there were similar unverified and uncorroborated reports
that the then national security advisor, Antony Lake, had been targeted for assassination by
terrorists based in Sudan. Lake was moved into Blair House, a federal mansion across the street
from the White House and then to a second, secret, location. The New York Times reported that
Lake “disappeared from view around the time the embassy’s personnel were withdrawn”. There is
little doubt that the supposed threat to Lake was as fabricated as the CIA reports concerning the
American embassy in Khartoum. The newspaper stated that: “The threat to Tony Lake had a
chilling effect on the National Security Council.”
There is no doubt that the equally spurious “threats” to American diplomats and their children in
Khartoum had an equally chilling effect on the State Department and other agencies. The fact
remains however that these “threats”, then seen as proof of Sudanese complicity in terrorism, were
contained in the over one hundred reports that the CIA later admitted it had to withdraw because
they had been fabricated. To have to withdraw one or two intelligence reports on such serious
matters is bad enough. To have to withdraw over one hundred such reports can only be described
as a massive systemic intelligence failure. One can only but point out that the Clinton
Administration used the Sudanese government’s inability to react to “specific” threats made by
“specific” terrorist organisations against American diplomats – non-existent, fabricated threats – as
examples both of Sudan’s involvement with terrorism and non-cooperation.
The American embassy in Khartoum was subsequently partly re-opened in October 1997, and
Antony Lake eventually did come out of hiding. And yet, as late as March 2000, four years after
the above intelligence fiasco, the White House was still falsely stating: “In 1996, we removed fulltime
staff from the Embassy and relocated them to Nairobi for security reasons.” [40] In what could
pass for a snapshot of the accuracy of Clinton Administration claims about Sudan and terrorism in
general, the New York Times stated that:
“the Central Intelligence Agency…recently concluded that reports that had appeared
to document a clear link between the Sudanese Government and terrorist activities
were fabricated and unreliable…The United States is entitled to use military force to
protect itself against terrorism. But the case for every such action must be rigorously
established. In the case of the Sudan, Washington has conspicuously failed to prove
its case.” [41]
Ambassador Petterson, the United States ambassador to Sudan from 1992-95, clearly documents
an earlier example of the Clinton Administration acting upon fabricated and unreliable claims of
Sudanese complicity in “terrorism”. In his memoirs of his time in Sudan Ambassador Petterson
reveals that in August 1993, “information about a plan to harm American officials led the State
Department to order an evacuation of our spouses and children and a reduction of my American
staff by one-third”. Petterson stated that “we at the embassy had seen or heard nothing
manifesting a clear and present danger from either terrorists or the Sudanese government. But the
order was firm and irrevocable”. [42] Petterson also documented that subsequently “new information”
had been “acquired” which indicated “an increasingly precarious situation for Americans in
Khartoum”. Ambassador Petterson later reveals that the allegations in question were unfounded:
“The months wore on, no credible threat to embassy Americans materialized, and
eventually serious doubt was raised about the validity of the information that had led
to the evacuation.” [43]
It perhaps goes without saying that for a government to evacuate the spouses and children of
diplomats, and to reduce its embassy staff, is a serious matter. It is an even more serious matter
when a government totally closes an embassy, withdrawing all diplomats and dependants. This
was done on two occasions in Sudan. The partial evacuation happened in 1993. The total
evacuation was carried out in 1996. The Clinton Administration ordered both evacuations on the
basis of intelligence information received which supposedly warned of threats to American
diplomats and their families. On both occasions the Administration also demanded that the
Sudanese government somehow deal with these threats, and it was inferred that if Khartoum did
not do so this would be more evidence of Sudan’s involvement with terrorism. It is now clear, as
outlined by independent sources such as Ambassador Petterson, and the New York Times, that
both the partial evacuation of American embassy staff and dependants in 1993, and the full
withdrawal of the embassy in 1996, were the results of faulty intelligence reports based on claims
subsequently revealed to have been fabricated.
The yawning gap between American claims about Sudan and terrorism, and reality, was also
clearly demonstrated by the American cruise missile attack on the al-Shifa medicine factory in
Khartoum in 1999. The Clinton Administration claimed, amongst other things, that the factory was
involved in the production of weapons of mass destruction and that it was linked to Osama bin-
Laden. Every single American claim about the al-Shifa factory was proven – largely by the
American media itself – to have been false. [44] Despite initially claiming that the factory was owned
by bin Laden, Clinton Administration officials subsequently admitted that when they attacked the
factory they did not know who the owner was, Under Secretary of State Thomas Pickering stating
that who owned the plant “was not known to us”. When, several days later, the American
government learnt, from subsequent media coverage of the attack, who actually owned the factory,
that person, Mr Saleh Idris, was then retrospectively listed under U.S. legislation dealing with
“specially designated terrorists”. On 26 August, 1998, the Office of Foreign Assets Control, the
unit within the U.S. Treasury Department charged with the enforcement of anti-terrorism
sanctions, froze more than US$ 24 million of Mr Idris’s assets. These assets had been held in Bank
of America accounts. On 26 February 1999, Mr Idris filed an action in the U.S. District Court for
the District of Columbia, for the release of his assets, claiming that the government’s actions had
been unlawful. His lawyers stated that while the law used by the Clinton Administration to freeze
his assets required a finding that Mr Idris was, or had been, associated with terrorist activities, no
such determination had ever been made. Mr Idris, an opponent of the Khartoum government, had
never had any association whatsoever with terrorists or terrorism. On 4 May 1999, the deadline by
which the government had to file a defence in court, the Clinton Administration backed down and
had to authorise the full and unconditional release of his assets. [45] The listing of Sudan as a state
sponsor of terrorism provides a macro example of the Clinton Administration’s abuse of antiterrorist
legislation. The case of Mr Idris provides a micro example of this misuse. The Clinton
Administration’s clear abuse of anti-terrorist legislation and its manipulation and abuse of legal
measures for political expediency and convenience was not just immoral; it discredited American
anti-terrorist legislation internationally.
In the weeks and months following the al-Shifa bombing, the Sudan repeatedly called on the
United Nations and United States to inspect the remains of the factory for any evidence of
chemical weapons production. The Americans steadfastly refused to inspect the site. The irony of
such a position was no lost on the international community given that in 1998, the United States and Britain militarily attacked (and would ultimately invade) Iraq because that country would not
allowed the inspection of certain factories and the remains of factories, but when the Sudanese
requested a similar inspection of a site claimed to have been a chemical weapons factory, the
Clinton Administration pointedly refused. The Washington Post quoted a Sudanese diplomat at
the United Nations: “You guys bombed Iraq because it blocked U.N. weapons inspectors. We’re
begging for a U.N. inspection and you’re blocking it.” [46]
The observations of U.S. Senator Pat Roberts regarding the al-Shifa fiasco bear repeating: “[T]he
strike in regards to the Khartoum chemical plant cannot be justified…These are pretty harsh
words. I know one thing for sure. The intelligence agencies of other countries look at that and they
think, ‘Wait a minute, if you hit the wrong target or if in fact the justification was not accurate, it is
either ineptitude or, to get back to the wag-the-dog theory, something else is going on. That gets to
our credibility. And that is why both the administration and the Congress must insist on a foreign
policy where if you draw a line in the sand, if you make a statement, your credibility is
tremendously important.” [47]
The Clinton Administration’s claims about Sudan were further exposed by articles published in the
wake of the September 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States. The American magazine Vanity
Fair, and The Financial Times and The Observer newspapers in Britain reported that Sudan had
attempted to actively cooperate with the United States with regard to al-Qaeda and Osama bin-
Laden for several years and had been repeatedly rebuffed by Washington before being acted upon
in part by Washington in 2000. [48] Moreover, in November 2001, The Washington Post also
publicly revealed that in 1996 Sudan offered to extradite Osama bin-Laden to the United States,
just as Khartoum had extradited Ilich Ramirez Sanchez, “Carlos the Jackal”, to France in 1994.
Amazingly, the offer was declined. [49] After several years of declining repeated Sudanese invitations
for American intelligence and counter-terrorist personnel to come to Sudan and investigate
whatever they wanted to, joint CIA, FBI and State Department counter-terrorism and intelligence
teams have been in Sudan continuously, at Khartoum’s request, since early 2000, almost eighteen
months before the attacks on 11 September 2001. [50] The Observer confirmed that in May 2001
these teams had given Sudan “a clean bill of health” with regard to allegations of terrorism. In
August 2001 Bush Administration officials further confirmed that the Sudanese-American
cooperation on counter-terrorism had been positive. [51] This American-Sudanese intelligence
cooperation was said to have “covered everything”. [52] In fact, based on these extensive
investigations, the United States had agreed to the lifting of the limited United Nations sanctions
on Sudan. [53] The then U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Walter Kansteiner
confirmed that Sudan had been co-operating with the United States for some time before the
World Trade Center attacks, and that this cooperation had reached new levels since 11 September:
“We appreciate Khartoum’s relationship with us.”
[54] The Clinton Administration’s projections
were exposed for the propaganda they had been.
A pattern of intelligence failure regarding Sudan continued at least until 2002, with the United
States intelligence agencies continuing to accept at face value claims by paid sources that
Khartoum was engaged in terrorist conspiracies against the Washington. These claims, including
an alleged plot to crash an airplane into the Bush White House, were conclusively shown to have
been false in Richard Miniter’s 2005 book, Shadow War: The Untold Story of How Bush is Winning the War on Terror. [55] Miniter documents how, despite years of faulty and discredited
intelligence emanating from paid sources in Sudan in the 1990s, American intelligence continued
to rely, at least until 2002, on Sudanese sources again subsequently revealed to have made up false
claims of terrorist involvement for financial gain.
Putting Domestic Politics before the War on Terrorism
There is little doubt that that American domestic policy issues – certainly with regard to Sudan –
have clearly on occasion been prioritised above the much heralded “war on terrorism”, during both
the Clinton and Bush administrations. The anti-Sudan lobby in Washington, deeply rooted as it
was within Congress, undoubtedly pressured the Clinton administration to destabilise and isolate
Sudan, echoing claims of Sudanese involvement in terrorism. This pressure made it difficult for
American intelligence agencies to accept repeated Sudanese offers to share intelligence and
cooperate in counter-terrorism. Newsweek observed that CIA officials did not dare “to launch
operations that could get them hauled before a congressional inquisition.” [56] The US News &
World Report has confirmed this sort of skewed influence on anti-terrorism legislation, noting
that those officials responsible for the terrorist listing are reluctant to propose any changes
“because they know they would be overruled by higher-ups at…Congress who are captive to the
lobbies that track who’s on and who’s off [the list]. For example, the Christian lobby resists
revision of Sudan’s status…” [57]
It is also evident that the Bush Administration has chosen to put domestic politics before the
effective prosecution of the war on terrorism. In September 2004, the Bush administration chose to
label the tragic conflict in Darfur as “genocide”, an act that can only be seen as hostile and which
badly damaged the Government of Sudan, in order to please the Christian right political
constituency within the United States. This was admitted by former Senator Jack Danforth,
President Bush’s special envoy to Sudan, in an interview with the BBC in July 2005. [58] And the
claim of genocide was one which was contradicted by observers who were far better placed to
form an objective judgement. Such claims run contrary to statements made by groups such as
Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), the biggest aid agency in Darfur. Dr Mercedes Taty, the deputy
emergency director of MSF, has stated: “I don’t think that we should be using the word ‘genocide’
to describe this conflict. Not at all. This can be a semantic discussion, but nevertheless, there is no
systematic target - targeting one ethnic group or another one. It doesn’t mean either that the
situation in Sudan isn’t extremely serious by itself.” [59] MSF President Dr Jean-Hervé Bradol had
also previously stated that the use of the term genocide was inappropriate: “Our teams have not
seen evidence of the deliberate intention to kill people of a specific group.” [60]
Labelling the Darfur crisis as genocide may have succeeded in pleasing right-wing constituencies
and diverting media attention away from the disastrous events in Iraq – it was a simple enough
equation – but it needlessly badly damaged a key ally in the war on terrorism. [61] And, ironically, in
so doing the administration strengthened the position of the key rebel movement involved in the
Darfur conflict, the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). JEM is widely seen as an ultra-Islamist
movement closely identified with Dr Turabi and is opposed to any engagement with the United
States, especially on counter-terrorism.
Conclusions
The lessons of the United States’ approach to Sudan with regard to terrorism and counter-terrorism
during both the Clinton and Bush administrations are clear. The Clinton administration’s misuse of
US federal legislation, for example the listing of Sudan as a state sponsor of terrorism in the
absence of any evidence supporting this move, undermined US credibility on terrorism in the eyes
of its allies and others within the international community. Sudan’s continued listing, and the use
of claims of “terrorism” for domestic or other political reasons, continues to undermine American
credibility in the war on terrorism. The US News & World Report has reported that experts have
noted that “creating a believable list is important…if the United States is to gather international
support for sanctions or military action”. Ambassador Robert Oakley, a former senior United
States anti-terrorist coordinator, has admitted that a politicized list makes people doubt American
credibility: “A politicized list makes people doubt your objectivity”. [62] There is no place for
contradictory messages in the war on terrorism. Any such contradiction merely aids the terrorists,
their supporters and those who have chosen to pursue a policy of indifference or hostility to
American foreign policy.
The need for accurate and up-to-date intelligence in the war on terrorism is crystal clear. Sudan has
provided and continues to provide vital information in this war. The dangers of politicised or
faulty intelligence were spelt out in the disastrous 1998 attack on the al-Shifa factory. This further
weakened US credibility internationally. The lessons of al-Shifa – the reliance upon questionable
and politicised intelligence about alleged weapons of mass destruction – were clearly not taken on
board given that similar American claims were made in the lead-up to the war in Iraq in 2003 – claims which ultimately destroyed the international consensus even amongst US allies with regard
to the Iraq conflict. Reliance upon questionable intelligence in the war on terrorism is dangerous.
Another clear lesson is that for the Bush administration to credibly lead the global war on
terrorism it must divorce itself from the arteriosclerotic hindrance of having to pander to
misguided and poorly-informed domestic constituencies. It is a matter of record that the powerful
anti-Sudan lobbies within the United States have significantly impeded the effective prosecution of
the war on terrorism, both before and after the horrific events of 9/11. Indeed, the horrific events
of 11 September 2001 would never have happened had the Clinton Administration accepted the
1996 Sudanese offer to extradite Osama bin-Laden (or repeated offers to assist with counterterrorist
afterwards). The administration’s reluctance to do so was clearly heavily influenced not
only by flawed policy but also by anti-Sudanese lobbies within Washington which exist to this
day.
Footnotes |
